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ABSTRACT Different capacity incentives like feed-in-tariff have been considered to encourage companies 
to invest in wind power units. One of the main challenges of the electricity market policymakers is the 
determination of this fixed payment based on limited funding in a way that the investment cost of wind units 
is compensated and the associated investment risk is reduced. The main contribution of this paper is the 
introduction of a method to manage the amount of payment or incentives during a time horizon to reach the 
targeted wind capacity and reduce its investment risk. In this regard, the ratio-based incentive is introduced. 
To study the effects of such a policy, the long-term behavior of the electricity market is simulated by a 
dynamic model, which is a useful tool for policymakers to analyze the effects of their policies. Then, 
conditional value at risk and value at risk concepts are used to measure the risk of wind capacity investment. 
The results illustrate that the ratio-based incentive is more effective than the feed-in-tariff in the context of 
decreasing the risk of investment, reducing total CO2 production, electricity price reduction, and speed of 
providing higher amounts of wind capacity. 
INDEX TERMS Capacity investment, Electricity market, Investment incentive, Risk measurement, System 
dynamics, Wind units 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to decrease the growth rate of global warming, 
environmental regulations are established by international 
societies. The main purpose of these policies is the reduction 
of carbon dioxide emissions along with the consumption of 
fossil fuels [1]. On the other hand, since the share of thermal 
power plants in the production of carbon dioxide is 
considerable, choosing alternative ways to supply 
sustainable energy is an important challenge for decision-
makers [2]. This is because providing sustainable energy 
resources is an integral part of economic growth in each 
country [3]. Therefore, the utilization of renewable energies 
for the production of electrical energy is an attractive way to 
reduce greenhouse gases and to limit the consumption of 
fossil fuels. Among various types of renewable energies such 
as solar energy, wind energy, biomass energy, tidal energy, 
etc., wind energy is known as a cleaner, more productive, 
and rapidly growing energy resource that influences solving 
the problem of energy scarcity [1]. Studies demonstrate that 
European countries strive for meeting a considerable portion 
of their demand through wind energy. In this regard, the 
average annual installed wind capacity in Germany, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom by 2020 has reached 2952.5 MW, 
1224.5 MW, and 1363.8 MW, respectively [4]. 
In most countries, electricity generation companies work in 
a restructured environment [5]. The liberalization of the 
electricity market led to many challenges for investors and 
market regulators. Meanwhile, high investment costs and 
uncertain future revenue of wind units have declined the 
willingness of investors to invest in these units. Therefore, in 
order to get around this problem, various incentives have been 
introduced to support wind capacity investment [6]. Although 
new incentive policies based on supporting research and 
development activities are introduced [7], most of these 
incentives revolve around two divisions: feed-in-tariff (FIT) 
and renewable energy quotas or tradable green certificates [8]. 
In the common FIT, a fixed payment is considered for 
renewable energy resources to cover part of their high 
investment costs. Determination of the amount of this payment 
is an important challenge for market policymakers. This 
payment can act as a double-edged sword. A low amount of 
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payment cannot motivate companies to invest. Accordingly, 
wind capacity will not be developed as expected. In contrast, 
a high amount of payment can waste funding or cause over 
investment which can endanger the security of weak systems. 
An investigation of published works illustrates that a great 
deal of effort has been put in studying the impact of incentives 
on the development of distributed energy resources. A 
dynamic model was used to assess the effect of different wind 
capacity incentives from the market regulator’s viewpoint in 
[6]. In [9], conventional and wind capacity investment 
dynamics were modeled and a time series simulation 
technique for wind speed prediction was proposed. Besides, a 
subsidy for the construction of wind farms was considered as 
an incentive. The main shortcoming of the presented case 
study of [9] is the lack of considering the regional and seasonal 
correlation of wind speed data with electricity demand profile. 
In [10], a system dynamic model was utilized to study the 
effect of different capacity mechanisms on market behavior. 
The effect of incentives on the development of distributed 
energy resources in an electricity market was studied by the 
market dynamic model in [11]. Various dynamic models were 
proposed to study different countries' electricity market 
behavior in Colombia [12], Sweden [13], and China [14]. In 
[15], the supply and demand of electricity were described in 
the Colombian national market based on the system dynamics 
approach. Then, the stability of the equilibrium points and 
non-smooth dynamics of the mentioned model were analyzed. 
In [15], the capacity to build was defined by a piecewise-
smooth function illustrating the magnitude of the investments, 
and three fixed values were considered for that. Such 
assumptions in real-world decision-making are not true and 
the installed capacity cannot be limited to three values. In [16], 
a system dynamics model was applied to study the effect of 
various environmental policies on wind power development in 
China. These policies comprised the air pollution and low-
carbon constraint policy, the purchased electricity power 
policy, and the plan for regional coordinated development. 
Authors of [17] studied the long-term effect of cautious FIT 
reduction on photovoltaic generation in the UK. Different 
investment strategies of the power enterprises considering 
carbon trading in China were studied in [18] based on system 
dynamic theory. A new FIT mechanism for wind units based 
on a regional power grid was proposed in [19]. Different 
studies were also conducted about renewable energy 
investment risk through various methods. For instance, the 
authors of [20] provided a multicriteria decision methodology 
based on a three-stage decision framework for the 
identification of risk factors, assessment of them, and the 
evaluation of strategies to overcome these factors. In [21], the 
five most relevant renewable energy technology investment 
risk types (curtailment, policy, price, resource, and 
technology) were identified and investigated through 
interview transcripts. In [22], renewable energies investment 
risk factors in different countries were studied and categorized 
into five types: economic, technical, environmental, social, 
and political. Then, the fuzzy-analytic network process was 
used to weigh and assess these factors. In some papers, system 
dynamic models were used to investigate the risk of renewable 
energy investment. For instance, in [23], a system dynamic 
approach was used to evaluate the investment risk of 
renewable units considering three categories: Technical risk, 
Market risk, and Policy risks. In another work, wind power 
generation investment opportunities and their associated risk 
in Iran were studied by a system dynamic approach [24]. In 
another line of research, social benefits due to the integration 
of large-scale wind units in a deregulated power market were 
reviewed [25]. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the investment risk 
of wind units in dynamic models has not been measured 
through conditional value at risk (CVaR) and value at risk 
(VaR) methods so far. Moreover, most of the reviewed articles 
tend to find the optimum amount of fixed payments as an 
incentive, while they do not answer the following questions. 
Is it necessary to change the amounts of these payments? If 
yes, when should it be decreased or increased? 
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a 
method for the management of these payments to reach the 
pre-defined percentage of installed wind capacity in the long-
term and reduce the wind capacity investment risk, 
simultaneously. For this purpose, a ratio-based incentive is 
introduced. In this incentive model, the amount of payments is 
not fixed during the time horizon and it decreases as the 
percentage of wind capacity rises in comparison with 
predetermined percentage capacity and vice versa. Moreover, 
this incentive compensates for the low incomes of wind units 
to mitigate investment risk when prices are low. In this regard, 
the system dynamic approach is used to study the effect of the 
proposed incentive on the development of the wind capacity 
from the market regulator’s viewpoint. The procedure of wind 
capacity investment has a dynamic nature and affects other 
factors like electricity prices during a long-term period. 
Therefore, the long-term behavior of the market is simulated 
by a dynamic model, and important feedbacks on the market 
and time delays are considered in this study. Furthermore, 
CVaR and VaR measures are used for investment risk 
measurement, and the risk of wind capacity investment is 
analyzed. 
The rest of the paper is arranged in the following way: in 
Section ΙΙ, the general aspects of the proposed model are 
introduced. Section ΙΙΙ presents the different parts of the 
dynamics model. Section IV introduces the case studies and 
analyzes the results of the simulation. Section V is devoted to 
the sensitivity analysis. Section VI discusses the major 
conclusions.  
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FIGURE 1.  The causal loop diagram of an electricity market subjected to ratio-based incentive for wind units. 
II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MODEL  
To analyze the effects of the proposed incentive on the 
electricity market, the main components of the electricity 
market and their relationship should be recognized by the 
system dynamics approach. The most important advantages of 
the system dynamics approach are its simple mathematical 
equations and standard graphical diagrams [26]. The main 
elements of the dynamic systems comprising feedback loops, 
delays, causal loop diagrams, stock, and flow variables, can be 
found in [6] and [27] in detail. Such a system helps market 
regulators and policymakers investigate the results of different 
policies. In the current paper, the time step is one week, and 
simulation is carried out for a time horizon equal to 30 years 
(1560 weeks). Four different types of technologies comprising 
hard coal (HC), combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), gas 
turbines (GT), and wind technology are utilized to meet the 
electricity demand. Wind farms participate in the electricity 
market and due to the stochastic nature of wind speed, their 
generated power is assumed as a random variable. Part of the 
load is supplied by wind units as soon as they are available and 
the rest of the demand which is known as net consumption is 
supplied by other conventional units. During this process, the 
price of electricity is determined [28]. Therefore, wind units 
influence the market price. Consequently, it can be stated that 
they participate in the market.  
Fig. 1 illustrates the causal loop diagram of an electricity 
market. There are two types of feedback loops in the dynamics 
of an economic system: positive loops that reinforce changes 
of the system and negative loops that balance and oppose these 
changes [29]. Positive (negative) signs show that any increase 
in the cause or independent variable will lead to an increase 
(decrease) in the effect or dependent variable [9]. There are 
five negative and one positive feedback loop in this diagram. 
Loops number one and two are inner balancing loops that 
show the price elasticity of fossil fuel units’ generation and the 
price elasticity of electricity demand, respectively [9]. The 
third loop (black arrows) and the fourth loop (pink arrows) are 
outer negative feedback loops that control the investments in 
new conventional fossil fuel units and wind farms, 
respectively [9]. In this paper, in order to show a causal loop 
diagram of the proposed ratio-based wind capacity incentive 
and complete the introduced model in [9], two new loops are 
considered. The first loop is a negative loop, which is shown 
by red arrows. Part of the ratio-based incentive that guarantees 
the installation of a pre-defined percentage of wind units is 
determined through this loop. As the expected profitability of 
wind units declines, investment decisions will decrease and 
this will lead to a reduction of wind power capacity after a time 
delay. Then, the ratio of wind capacity to conventional 
capacity decreases. Consequently, the amount of ratio-based 
incentive for wind units rises and this will lead to an increase 
in the expected profitability of wind units in a balancing loop. 
The other loop shown by green arrows is a positive loop that 
describes part of the ratio-based incentive mechanism that 
mitigates the investment risk of wind units. As the expected 
profitability of wind units rises, the tendency of companies to 
invest in wind capacity increases. This will lead to the rise of 
wind capacity and wind power generation after a time delay. 
By increasing the wind power generation, electricity spot price 
declines after the reduction of net consumption. Then, the rise 
of the ratio-based wind incentive is the result of price 
reduction. Finally, expected profitability increases due to the 
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growth of the ratio-based incentive. In another word, based on 
this loop, when electricity price decreases, the value of ratio-
based incentive increases to compensate for the low incomes 
of wind units and this, in turn, will lead to risk reduction. 
The construction time of conventional and wind units is the 
main time delay in this model [9]. Ancillary services markets, 
transmission and distribution costs, reactive power markets, 
and transmission network effects are neglected in this paper. 
Different parts of the proposed dynamic model are introduced 
in detail in the following section. 
III. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MODEL  
A. ELECTRICITY DEMAND  
A weekly time step is considered in this study denotes that 
electricity generation and consumption are cleared on a 
weekly basis. Fig. 2 shows the weekly load coefficients that 
are used in this paper. This weekly load profile is extracted 
from the historical data of the USA electricity demand [30]. 
The first week of January is assumed as the first week of this 
Figure. The amount of weekly demand changes year by year 
with respect to a constant value defined as the annual demand 
growth rate. This value is considered as a random variable and 
the Gaussian distribution function represents its stochastic 
nature with standard deviation and expected value equal to 1% 
and 1.2%, respectively [7]. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.  Weekly pattern of electricity demand.  
 
In this paper, the weekly demand is calculated by (1) [11]. 
Demandf(t + ∆T) =





in which, AGR is the annual demand growth rate in (%/yr), 
Demandf is the weekly demand in (MW) and ΔT is one year. 
It is assumed that the electricity demand (in MW) to be 
unchanged during each week. Therefore, the electricity 
consumption (in MWh) in each week can be obtained by the 
multiplication of electricity demand (in MW) and the hours of 
a week [9]. The long-term price elasticity of electricity 
consumption is calculated based on (2). 






In (2), Q(t) is electricity consumption after price response 
in week t in (MWh), Qf is forecasted electricity consumption 
in (MWh), PRP is the average of electricity market price in the 
past year ($/MWh), prav is reference price which is supposed 
to be the average of prices in five recent years ($/MWh), and 
PED is the price elasticity of demand [9]. Although the 
uncertainty in demand growth rate is considered in this paper, 
for simplicity, the uncertainty in the demand profile is ignored 
and this profile is modified based on the price elasticity of 
demand and annual demand growth rate. 
B. GENERATION OF CONVENTIONAL FOSSIL FUEL 
TECHNOLOGIES  
Three different types of fossil fuel technologies are considered 
to meet the net consumption. The marginal cost of generation 
for each technology consists of fuel price and emission tax. 
One of the uncertainties related to power plant investments is 
fuel price uncertainty. There are many sophisticated 
approaches, such as geometric Brownian motion (GBM) and 
the mean-reverting process to model the fuel price [31]. Since 
the focus of this paper is on the development of wind capacity, 
the fuel price is considered as a fixed value. To indicate the 
competition between several technologies, all generation units 
of the same technology are considered as a particular company 
[9]. Moreover, due to the fact that the effect of incentives on 
wind capacity development is discussed from the perspective 
of a system regulator/policymaker, a centralized approach is 
considered as a better choice. The main strength that can be 
seen in leveraging a centralized structure is the top-down 
guidance and focus that can be maintained by the policymaker 
while working directly with the system/market operators, 
utilities and generation companies, or power distributors, to 
establish priorities and employ their knowledge and resources 
to implement those across the power sector. It should be noted 
that a decentralized approach could also help drive capacity 
development and investment plans, however, the lack of a 
centralized entity providing templates and guidance can often 
lead to inconsistency across the power sector. More 
information about the dynamic model of the decentralized 
system can be found in [32]. 
Although the decommissioning of equipment (blades, 
generators, boilers, etc.) and their replacement is not 
considered, a vintage model is utilized to demonstrate the 
difference between the efficiency and variable costs of new 
fossil fuel units and older ones. Fossil fuel technologies 
include three vintages: new units, middle-aged, and old units 
[9]. The marginal cost of generation for each vintage of 




+ eij × EPi(t) (3) 
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in which, i is subscript refers to each technology (1:HC, 
2:CCGT, 3:GT, 4:wind), j is subscript refers to each vintage, 
MC is the marginal cost ($/MWh), FP is fuel price ($/MJ), con 
is conversion factor (MJ/MWh), Eff is efficiency (%), e is 
emission rate (Ton/MWh), and EP is emission price in 
($/Ton). After calculating the ratio of the market price in the 
previous time step (PR) to the marginal cost of each type of 
technology in the current time step (MC), the capacity factor 
is extracted from the supply curves of Fig. 3 [33]. 
Accordingly, based on the capacity factor in each time step 
and the total installed capacity of each type of technology, the 
total generation energy by conventional units can be obtained 
in the mentioned time step [9]. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.  Supply curves for each technology [33].  
C. WIND TECHNOLOGY GENERATION 
Wind power generation depends on the wind velocity and 
wind velocity is influenced by seasonal variations and 
geographical characteristics [34]. The behavior of wind speed 
in most regions is usually fitted by Weibull distribution 
functions [35]. Since the demand coefficients are gained from 
historical data of electricity consumption in the USA, the 
hourly statistical wind speed data in Texas [36] are used to 
coordinate the wind generation profile with the demand profile 
from the regional aspect. Then, the Weibull distribution 
function of wind speed in each season is achieved from the 
data by the introduced method of [37]. Based on the proposed 
method in [35], the Monte-Carlo technique is applied to 
generate different scenarios for weekly wind speed from the 
Weibull distribution functions. Then, the wind speed time 
series simulation technique is utilized to consider the 
chronological characteristics of wind speed. Due to the 
difference in turbine hub height and height of installed wind 
speed measurement tools, which is equal to 10 meters [36], the 
measured wind speed is modified by (4) [38]. 







   (4) 
in which, wsH is the wind speed at H (m/s), wsbase is the wind 
speed at Hbase (m/s), H0 is terrain characteristics parameter of 
the region, H is the height of the turbine’s hub (m), and Hbase 
is the height of measurement tools (m). In order to do the wind 
speed modification and calculation of the output power of the 
wind turbines, the technical data associated with Los Vientos 
Wind Farm in Texas are used. Although there are various 
types of turbines in this farm, all turbines in wind farms are 
considered as Siemens SWT 108 2.3 model [39]. The power 
curve of this type of turbine is depicted in Fig. 4 [40]. In this 
Fig., the cut-in, rated, cut-off wind speeds are 3, 11, and 20 
m/s, respectively, and the rated power of the turbine is 2.3 MW 
[40]. The height of the turbine’s hub is 100 m and the terrain 
characteristics parameter of the region is 0.01 [39]. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.  Power curve of 87 Siemens SWT 108 2.3 turbine. 
Once the wind speed modification is done, the output power 
of all wind turbines at any time can be obtained from the 
turbine’s output power curve and wind speed. 
D. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND DYNAMICS  
In this paper, the electricity spot price is considered as a stock 
variable. More information about stock and flow structures in 
the dynamic system theory can be obtained in [29]. It is 
assumed that in the electricity market, the price increases if 
energy demand increases while the opposite happens if the 
production of electric energy exceeds the consumption. As 
shown in (5) the changes in electricity prices are calculated in 
each time interval then, based on (6), the price of electricity at 
each time step is equal to the sum of the price changes and the 
price of electricity at the previous time step [10]. 




PR(t + ∆t) = PR(t) + ∫ ∆PR(τ)
t+Δt
t
. dτ  (6) 
where ΔPR is electricity market price changes ($/MWh), 
PR is electricity market price ($/MWh), Qnet is the amount of 
electricity net consumption (MWh), TEG is total electricity 
generation of conventional units (MWh), and Δt is one week. 
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E. PRICE EXPECTATION AND CAPACITY INVESTMENT  
For successful investment, correct future price prediction by 
generation utilities is necessary. In this paper, the trend 
extrapolation of variables besides the exponential smoothing 
forecast technique is implemented for the price expectation 
[29]. The economic assessment of the project is carried out by 
the net present value (NPV) method [9]. Through this method, 
cash flows are transferred to a reference time or the time of 
decision in different years of the project. Then, the profitability 
of the capacity development can be calculated at time t 
through the following equation for each type of technology 
[9]. 
PROFi(t) =








In (7), i is subscript refers to each technology, PROF is total 
profit in planning time horizon in ($/ MW), Ta is amortization 
period in (yr), PROFe is the common expected term of 
operating profit in ($/MWyr), OMC is average term of 
operational and maintenance costs in ($/MWyr), Drate is the 
discount rate in (%/yr) which is 9%/yr [7], Tcons is the time 
needed for construction of units (yr), and IC is investment cost 
in ($/MW). Based on (8), the expected profit of each 
technology depends on the expected electricity price and 
marginal cost in each time step [9]. 
PROFei(t) =
∫ (PRe(τ) − MCi(τ))
t
t−Tp
. dτ      ∀  PRe(t) ≥ MCi(t) (8)
 
In this equation, PRe is the expected price in ($/MWh), MC 
is the marginal cost of generation in ($/MWh), and TP is 
perceived time equal to one year. By substituting (8) in (7) and 
solving the PROF=0 for Drate, the parameter called investment 
rate of return (IRR) can be determined. After the calculation 
of the internal rate of return, profitability index and investment 













in which, IRR is the internal rate of return (%/yr), PIt is the 
profitability index of technology, Drate is adjusted discount rate 
(%/yr), İ is investment rate of technology (MW/yr), RCR is 
retired capacity rate of technology (MW/yr), P is installed 
capacity (MW), Tage is the lifetime of each unit (yr), and CAR 
is capacity addition rate of technology to cover the maximum 
demand (MW/yr). The capacity addition rate of technology for 
supplying the maximum demand depends on the demand 
growth rate. In this paper, if the demand growth exceeds the 
reserve margin, the value of CAR is positive and it is equal to 
their difference; otherwise, it is equal to zero. This is because 
most of the companies decide to invest in new capacity in 
scarcity events and during high prices. Moreover, a fixed 
pattern for supplying the maximum demand by different 
generation technologies is considered. It is assumed that 40%, 
15%, 35%, and 10% of electricity peak load is supplied by HC, 
GT, CCGT, and wind technologies, respectively [33]. The 
reserve margin in each time step is equal to the difference of 
installed capacity of conventional units and net consumption. 
In (10), SCL is the saturation capacity level for each 
technology (unit less); βs and γ are fixed parameters of the S-
shaped investment function. The fixed values of SCL, βs, and 
γ are shown in Table Ι [41], [42]. 
F. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT  
In this section, the under-construction capacity and installed 
capacity for electricity generation are considered as stock 
variables. In the modeling of capacity development, long-term 
time delays due to the construction of new capacity are 
considered. Fig. 5 illustrates the stock and flow diagram of 
capacity development. As shown in this Fig. the investment 
rate and construction accomplishing rate of technology are 
inflow and outflow variables of under-construction capacity, 
respectively. Besides, the construction accomplishing rate and 
retired capacity rate are inflow and outflow variables of 
installed capacity, respectively. The amount of installed 
capacity for each type of technology is determined in each 
time step from the investment rate, which was calculated in 
the previous section [9]. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.  The stock and flow diagram of generation capacity 
development. 
G. RATIO BASED INCENTIVE FOR WIND CAPACITY 
DEVELOPMENT  
To encourage the companies to invest in wind capacity, a 
ratio-based incentive is considered. This incentive consists of 
two parts. The first part, incentiveP, is calculated based on the 
percentage of wind capacity compared to the target value and 
the second part, incentiveR, is calculated to reduce investment 
risk. The first part provides high amounts of income for wind 
farms when there is a lack of capacity and the second part 
guarantees their income when prices are low.   
Part of the payments to wind units (incentiveP) changes 
proportional to the predetermined ratio of wind capacity to the 
total capacity of the fossil fuel units. This predefined ratio (D) 
is determined by market policymakers. In this paper, the ratio 
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is assumed to be 15% meaning that policymakers tend to 
motivate companies to reach the installed wind capacity up to 
15% of the installed fossil fuel capacity. To reach this purpose, 
incentiveP can be calculated from (12) in each time step. 
incentiveP(t) = A(t) × [B(t) + C(t)] (12) 
A(t) = max [ 
wct(t) − pw(t)
pw(t)
, 0] (13) 






C(t) = D ×  prav(t) × max [ 
TR(t) − RM(t)
TR(t)
, 0] (15) 
wct(t) = D × ptc(t) (16) 
TR(t) = E × (ptc(t) +  pw(t)) (17) 




where pr is electricity spot price ($/MWh) in time step t, wct 
is wind capacity target (MW), pw is the installed wind 
capacity (MW), ptc is the total installed capacity of fossil fuel 
technologies (MW), E is a fixed value equal to 0.15 [7], TR is 
targeted reserve margin (MW), D is the predefined ratio of 
wind capacity to conventional capacity, prav is reference price 
which is supposed to be the average of prices in five recent 
years ($/MWh), RM is reserve margin (MW), AGR is the 
annual demand growth rate in (%/yr), Demandf is the weekly 
demand in (MW), and ADGR is the changes in the average 
weekly load compared to the same week in the previous year 
(MW). The term A restricts the amount of incentive when the 
installed wind capacity is more than the predefined 
percentage. The term B provides high payments when there is 
a capacity shortage and term C intensifies these payments as 
the amount of reserve margin decreases. 
After the calculation of incentiveP, incentiveR should be 
obtained. As mentioned before, incentiveR is considered to 
compensate for the low incomes of wind farms. This type of 
payment can mitigate investment risk to a high extent. In ratio-
based incentive, incentiveR is equal to (19) in time step t. 
incentiveR(t) = max[(1 + D) × prav(t) − pr(t), 0] (19) 
in which, prav is the reference price ($/MWh) and pr is the 
electricity price ($/MWh). The average price in the recent 5 
years can be considered as the reference price [9]. 
Then, the value of the ratio-based incentive is extracted 
from incentiveP and incentiveR. The term incentive(t) in (20), 
demonstrates the amounts of ratio-based incentive ($/MWh) 
in each time step. 
incentive(t) = incentiveP(t) + incentiveR(t) (20) 
H. RISK ASSESSMENT OF MODEL  
Although the results of the study in [17] show that reduction 
in FIT payments reduces the photovoltaic investment in the 
residential sector, there is no investigation about the effect of 
fluctuations in FIT payments on installed capacity. In this 
section, required risk measures to study the wind capacity 
investment risk influenced by the proposed incentive, are 
introduced. Risk measures are necessary for the assessment of 
investment risk. Among different measures such as variance, 
shortfall probability, expected shortage, value at risk, and 
conditional value at risk for risk measurement, the last one 
fulfills the characteristics of desirable risk measures [43], [44]. 
In this paper, historical VaR and CVaR are applied for risk 
measurement.   
 
 
FIGURE 6.  Profit-and-loss probability density function. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the profit-and-loss probability density 
function of wind units during the time horizon. For the 
calculation of historical VaR, historical returns of assets are 
used. VaR can be depicted in units of the rate of return (%) or 
profit and loss. First of all, the profit resulting from the 
generation of wind units ($/MWh) at each time step is 
collected over the planning horizon. Then, VaR is obtained 
from the sorted historical statistical samples [45]. For 
example, in this study 1560 profit samples are gathered from 
1560 time steps. In other words, a unique profit is calculated 
for each time step. If profit1≤ profit2≤ profit3…≤ profit1560 are 
the sorted profits from per megawatt of wind capacity at each 
time step, then VaRα=0.95(profit) = profit78. The parameter α is 
known as the confidence level or significance level [46]. In 
this study, a higher amount of VaR represents lower risk. 
The conditional value at risk is defined as the expected 
value of the wind companies' profit lower than the (1-α)-
quantile of the profit distribution [43]. In other words, CVaR 
is defined as the average profit in the (1-α)×100% of the worst 
profits. This measure can be obtained by (21) [47]. In this 
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION RESULTS 
To study the effect of the proposed incentive on wind capacity 
investment and electricity price, a sample system was used. 
The characteristics of this system are illustrated in Table Ι. The 
initial peak demand is 15 GW. The planning horizon is 30 
years. The elasticity of demand to price is -0.1. The price cap 
is equal to 300 $/MWh. Also, simulation is carried out by the 
MATLAB software. 
TABLE I 
THE GENERATION SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
HC CCGT GT Wind Technology 
500 400 300 500 Capacity Under Construction 
(MW) 
4900 1900 550 1000 Initial Installed Capacity 
(MW) (Vintage 1) 
4900 1800 550 - Initial Installed Capacity 
(MW) (Vintage 2) 
1300 100 800 - Initial Installed Capacity 
(MW) (Vintage 3) 
3 1.5 1 1 Average Construction Time 
(Yr) 
40 30 20 20 Lifetime (Yr) 
1000 600 500 1500 Investment Cost ($/kW) 
3.6 10.5 10.5 0 Fuel Price Conversion 
Factor ($/MWh) 
26 26 26 0 Emission Price ($/Ton of 
CO2) 
16 16 16 12 Maintenance Cost ($/kW/yr) 
0.455 0.6 0.35 - Recourse Efficiency (%) 
(Vintage 1) 
0.425 0.57 0.32 - Recourse Efficiency (%) 
(Vintage 2) 
0.39 0.54 0.27 - Recourse Efficiency (%) 
(Vintage 3) 
0.87 0.33 0.29 - Emission Rate (Ton/MWh) 
(Vintage 1) 
0.9 0.35 0.31 - Emission Rate (Ton/MWh) 
(Vintage 2) 
0.95 0.4 0.37 - Emission Rate (Ton/MWh) 
(Vintage 3) 
1.5 3 2 3.3 SCL 
3.5 2 2.5 1.8 βs 
-2.8069 -2.6932 -2.5 -2.7 γ 
25 20 15 15 Amortization Period (Yr) 
 
In this section, three different cases are introduced to 
simulate market behavior under various conditions. The main 
features of these cases are indicated below. 
 First case: no incentive is considered for wind 
units. 
 Second case: ratio-based incentive is considered 
for wind units in which parameter D is 0.15. 
 Third case: a fixed payment is considered for wind 
units in each time step, which is equal to the 
average of the ratio-based incentive in the second 
case. 
The main purpose of selecting these cases is to provide a 
better insight into the effect of different incentive schemes 
exercised by the market regulator on wind capacity 
development and the investment risk of wind units. 
 
 
A. CASE 1 
Fig. 7 (a) illustrates the weekly average spot electricity price 
in case 1. High prices in each time step show that the electricity 
demand exceeds the generation, and low prices are seen as the 
demand becomes lower than the generation. Fig. 7 (b) 
demonstrates the demand, the total installed capacity of fossil 
fuel units, and reserve margin during the time horizon. The 
electricity demand rises in proportion to the annual demand 
growth rate and changes because of the price response. Fig. 7 
(c) and Fig. 7 (d) illustrate the installed capacity and 
investment rates for each technology, respectively. By 
decreasing the reserve margin, price increases. Therefore, as 
depicted in Fig. 7 (b) and (c), when reserve margin decreases, 
wind and conventional fossil fuel capacity rise after a time 
delay due to the high tendency of investors to acquire benefits. 
As shown in Fig. 7 (d), due to the high investment cost and 
emission penalty of hard coal units, their investment rate is 
lower than the investment rate of CCGT units. The 
fluctuations of the reserve margin in Fig. 7 (b) indicate the 
business cycles. Over and under-investment will lead to long-
time boom and bust cycles in the investment wave in Fig. 7 
(c). The variety in construction time, the lifetime of units, 
incentives, and retired capacity rate of technologies affect 
these cycles. Because of the high investment cost of wind 
units, the investment in this technology is not remarkable and 
there is more tendency to invest in CCGT units. Therefore, an 
incentive is necessary for the development of wind units. 
Since the results of this paper are in agreement with the 
findings of [9], the similarity in the general results of this paper 
and [9] can be considered as the validation of the dynamic 
model. For instance, in both papers, as the reserve margin 
decreases (increases), electricity price increases (decreases), 
or a few years after the price jump new installed capacity is 
added to the system. In other words, booms (busts) are 
revealed on the investment wave a few years after the price 
rise (reduction). 
B. CASE 2 
In case 2, the ratio-based incentive was considered in the 
system of case 1 to reduce the investment risk of wind 
technology and increase the ratio of installed wind capacity up 
to 15% of total fossil fuel installed capacity (D=0.15). Fig. 8 
(a) illustrates the weekly average spot electricity price in case 
2. The average price increased from 34.79 in case 1 to 34.82 
in case 2, and its standard deviation increased from 3.32 to 
3.40. This happened because of fossil fuel capacity reduction 
and increasing installed wind capacity in case 2 compared to 
case 1. The total installed fossil fuel capacity at the end of the 
time horizon is 19928.3 MW in case 1, while it is 19339.6 MW 
in case 2. The uncertainty in electricity generation by wind 
units increases the prices and its fluctuations in case 2. Fig. 8 
(b) demonstrates the demand, the total installed capacity of 
fossil fuel units, and reserve margin during the time horizon. 
Fig. 8 (c) and Fig. 8 (d) illustrate the installed capacity and 
investment rates for each technology, respectively. As shown 
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in Fig. 8 (c) and Fig. 8 (d), due to the implementation of the 
ratio-based incentive for wind units, an incentive which was 
calculated by (20) was paid to wind units when prices were 
low or the ratio of wind capacity to conventional capacity was 
lower than 15%. 
 
 
FIGURE 7.  Simulation results of case 1. 
 
Accordingly, the investment rate of wind units increased 
compared to case 1, and after a time delay, more wind capacity 
was added to the system. In addition, the investment rate of 
conventional units decreased compared to case 1, since most 
of the companies invest in wind technology. In this case, the 
total amount of wind incentive during the time horizon was 
8618.68 $/MWh and the weekly average of wind incentive 
was 5.5248 $/MWh. In the third case, a fixed payment equal 
to 5.5248 $/MWh was considered for wind units in each time 
step, to compare market behavior under an equal budget which 
was spent for wind capacity development. 
 
 
FIGURE 8.  Simulation results of case 2. 
C. CASE 3 
In case 3, fixed payments equal to 5.5248 $/MWh were 
considered as an incentive for wind units in the system of case 
1. Fig. 9 (a) illustrates the weekly average spot electricity price 
in case 3. Fig. 9 (b) demonstrates the demand, the total 
installed capacity of fossil fuel units, and reserve margin 
during the time horizon. Fig. 9 (c) and Fig. 9 (d) illustrate the 
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installed capacity and investment rates for each technology, 
respectively. The average price in case 2 increased from 34.82 
to 35.13 in case 3, and the standard deviation increased from 
3.40 in case 2 to 3.52 in case 3.  
 
 
FIGURE 9.  Simulation results of case 3. 
 
In case 2, the installed wind capacity and conventional 
capacity at the end of the time horizon are 5241.8 MW and 
19341 MW, respectively, while they are 4127.2 MW and 
17324 MW in case 3. Less installed capacity in case 3 is the 
main reason for higher average prices and higher price 
fluctuation in this case. Numerous price jumps in case 3, 
which are the result of the capacity shortage, will increase the 
iteration of the investment but with lower intensity. As a result, 
as shown in Fig. 9 (d), the number of investment decisions for 
wind capacity in case 3 is more than case 2, but because of the 
inefficiency of fixed payments in case 3, the amount of 
investment rate is lower than case 2. Therefore, the intensity 
of boom and bust cycles in case 3 is lower than in case 2. 
Supporting wind units during low prices and providing a high 
amount of incentive during capacity shortage periods is the 
effective feature of the ratio-based incentive. This feature is 
the main reason for high capacity addition after the capacity 
shortcomings. In case 3, the total amount of fixed payments 
during the time horizon was the same as case 2 (8618.68 
$/MWh). Some important simulation results of cases 2 and 3 
are depicted simultaneously in Fig. 10 and Table ΙΙ. 
Installed wind capacity, the incentive for wind units, the 
ratio of wind capacity to conventional capacity, the average of 
price in 5 recent years, and the investment rate of wind 
technology in cases 2 and 3 are compared in Fig. 10 (a), 10 
(b), 10 (c), 10 (d), and 10 (e), respectively. As shown in Fig. 
10 (a) and Fig. 10 (c), more wind capacity was installed by the 
implementation of the ratio-based incentive, and most portion 
of this capacity was installed at the beginning and middle of 
the time horizon. As shown in Fig. 10 (d), this will lead to the 
price reduction in case 2 compared to case 3. Fig. 10 (b) and 
Fig. 10 (c) illustrate that the amount of ratio-based incentive 
increased to 25 $/MWh when the ratio of wind capacity to 
conventional capacity is lower than 15%, and when this ratio 
reached over 15%, the amount of intentiveP will be zero and 
just a payment equal to incentiveR will be paid to wind units. 
For this reason, the rising percentage of installed wind 
capacity will not stop and reaches up to 25% at the end of the 
time horizon in case 2. The diagram of case 2 in Fig. 10 (e) 
shows that despite the accelerating of the wind capacity 
investment in the beginning and middle of the time horizon, 
the investment will not be postponed at the end of the time 
horizon. 
Table ΙΙ shows that by spending 8618.68 $/MWh as fixed 
payments in case 3, 4127.2 MW wind capacity can be installed 
by the end of the horizon, while by managing the same funding 
through ratio-based incentive, more wind capacity can be 
reached (5241.8 MW) and most of this capacity is installed at 
the beginning and middle of the time horizon. Moreover, 
comparing the standard deviation of prices in cases 2 and 3 
reveals that the implementation of the ratio-based incentive 
decreased price fluctuation. The average price of electricity in 
cases 2 and 3 were 34.8256 and 35.1354, respectively. 
Therefore, it can be stated that the ratio-based incentive not 
only benefits the wind power companies with payments but 
also profits the consumers through low prices. In addition, the 
ratio-based incentive is effective from the environmental 
aspect. Although the total energy generation and consequently 
the total CO2 production in case 2 is more than in case 3, the 
ratio of CO2 production to total energy generation in case 2 is 
lower than in case 3. This happens because of the more 
generation of wind units, in case 2. The average profit of wind 
units in cases 2 and 3 were 40.3504 and 40.6602, respectively. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation of wind units’ profits in 
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cases 2 and 3 were 2.3707 and 3.5277, respectively. The lower 
standard deviations and the average profit of wind units in case 
2 reveal that for motivating the companies toward investment 
in wind capacity, there is no need to provide high payments. 
Instead, by managing the timing of payments through ratio-
based incentive better results can be achieved. 
 
TABLE ΙΙ 
DATA FOR COMPRISING CASES 2 AND 3 
 Case 2 Case 3 
Total Amount of Wind Incentive 
($/MWh) 
8618.68 8618.68 
Average of Wind Incentive ($/MWh) 5.5248 5.5248 
Average of Prices ($/MWh) 34.8256 35.1354 
Standard Deviation of Prices ($/MWh) 3.4099 3.5277 
Average of Wind Units’ Profits ($/MWh) 40.3504 40.6602 
Standard Deviation of Wind Units’ Profits 
($/MWh) 
2.3707 3.5277 
Wind Capacity at the End of the Time 
Horizon (MW) 
5241.8 4127.2 
VaR (95) 37.6571 37.3455 
VaR (99) 37.3741 36.5574 
CVaR (95) 37.3876 36.7649 
CVaR (99) 37.3015 35.6125 
Total Generation (MWh) 3.9598×109 3.739×109 
Total CO2 Production (Ton) 2.5097×10
9 2.4218×109 
Ratio of CO2 Production to Total 
Generation (Ton/ MWh) 
0.6338 0.6477 
Total Generation of Wind Units(MWh) 2.7034×108 2.3199×108 
 
In order to validate the performance of the ratio-based 
incentive model, the investment risk of wind units was 
measured. For this purpose, VaR and CVaR were calculated 
for the profit of wind units in cases 2 and 3. In case 2, VaR(95) 
and VaR(99) were 37.65 and 37.37, respectively. It means that 
in 5% of the worst cases, profits were lower than 37.65, and in 
1% of them, profits were lower than 37.37. The amounts of 
VaR(95) and VaR(99) were 37.34 and 36.55 in case 3. This is 
depicted in the distribution function of wind units’ profit in 
Fig. 11. In case 2, CVaR(95) and CVaR(99) were 37.38 and 
37.30, respectively. These values show that the expected value 
of profit in 5% of the worst cases was 37.38 and it was 37.30 
in 1% of the worst cases. The amounts of CVaR(95) and 
CVaR(99) were 36.76 and 35.61 in case 3. The values of VaR 
and CVaR demonstrate that investment risk in case 2 is lower 
than in case 3. Higher installed wind capacity in case 2 
compared to case 3 confirms this claim. The approximate 
values of VaR and CVaR can be estimated from Fig. 11. The 
range of profits for wind units of case 3 varied from 34.06 to 
53.17, while in case 2, it varied from 37.26 to 68.7. Therefore, 
the values of VaR and CVaR in case 2 are more than those of 
case 3. Accordingly, the risk of wind capacity investment in 
case 3 is higher than in case 2. 
 
 
FIGURE 10.  Comparison of cases 2 and 3. 
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FIGURE 11.  Profit distribution function for cases 2 and 3. 
V.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
To investigate the impact of the policymaker’s decision on 
wind power investment, a sensitivity analysis was conducted. 
For this purpose, four values of 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% 
were selected for the targeted ratio of wind to conventional 
capacity (parameter D in (16)). It means that the payments are 
managed in a way that the ratio of wind capacity to 
conventional capacity rises more than the mentioned 
percentages. To simulate this part, case 2 was used. 
To encourage the companies to invest in wind units and 
achieve predetermined wind capacity ratios of 10%, 15%, 
20%, and 25%, the total amount of wind incentive during 30 
years was 5901.94, 8618.68, 11404.69, and 16377.04 $/MWh, 
respectively. In other words, the weekly average of wind 
payments was 3.783, 5.524, 7.310, and 10.498 $/MWh, 
respectively. Therefore, to have a better picture for the sake of 
comparison, the fixed payments equal to 3.783, 5.524, 7.310, 
and 10.498 $/MWh were considered for wind units in case 3. 
Fig. 12 compares the results of the implementation of the FIT 
and ratio-based incentive. In both cases, the total amount of 
payments during the time interval was the same. 
As shown in Fig. 12 when the same amount of funding was 
distributed between wind units through ratio-based incentive, 
more wind capacity was installed compared to the case that 
this funding was distributed as equal fixed payments. This 
shows that not only the amount of incentives is important to 
encourage companies to invest in wind units but also the 
timing of their allocation to these units is remarkable. Fig. 13 
illustrates the amount of the ratio-based incentive for different 
values of the parameter D. Based on this Fig., as the value of 
D increases, the amount of incentive rises. Despite reaching 
the targeted wind capacity, the amount of incentive will not 
become zero. This is because the investment risk of wind units 
should be mitigated in each time step through this incentive. 
Therefore, at the end of the time horizon, the installed wind 
capacity reaches over the predefined percentage.  
Table ΙΙΙ shows some useful data for different values of 
parameter D. When the specific funding is distributed through 
ratio-based incentive, the average price becomes lower 
compared to the case that the same funding is paid through 
fixed payments. The more the value of D increases, the more 
the average price declines. By implementing this incentive, the 
ratio of CO2 production to total energy production will 
decrease compared to the cases with fixed payments. 
Moreover, ratio-based incentive provides more energy from 
wind units for the power system. Comparing the VaR and 
CVaR values in cases 2 and 3 for different values of parameter 
D depicts that the proposed incentive decreases the investment 
risk of wind capacity. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The main goal of the present study was to demonstrate that by 
applying a new type of incentive and utilizing the same 
amount of funding that is spent in feed-in-tariff, electricity 
market policymakers could reduce the investment risk of wind 
units to reach more installed wind capacity and lower 
electricity prices. In this respect, the ratio-based incentive for 
wind capacity was introduced and a model was presented to 
simulate the dynamic behavior of the electricity market to 
analyze the investment in wind and fossil fuel units and 
investigate the impact of the mentioned incentive. Two 
positive and negative feedback loops were added to the former 
causal loop diagram of the electricity market. These loops 
helped get a better insight into the performance of the ratio-
based incentive. The mechanism of the ratio-based incentive 
was described in detail. The first part of this incentive was 
calculated to reach a predetermined targeted wind capacity 
and the second part of that was obtained to mitigate the risk of 
investment. Then, these two values were integrated for 
achieving the value of the incentive. Moreover, the value at 
risk and conditional value at risk measures were used to 
measure the risk of wind capacity investment.  
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FIGURE 12.  Installed wind capacity resulting from the implementation 
of Ratio-based incentive and fixed payment incentive. 
 
FIGURE 13.  The amount of ratio-based incentive for different values of 
D. 
TABLE ΙΙΙ 
COMPARING DATA FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF D 
 Case 2 Case 3 Case 2 Case 3 Case 2 Case 3 
The predefined ratio of wind capacity to 
conventional capacity (D) 
0.1 - 0.2 - 0.25 - 
Total Amount of Wind Incentive ($/MWh) 5901.94 5901.94 11404.69 11404.69 16377.04 16377.04 
Average of Wind Incentive ($/MWh) 3.7833 3.7833 7.3107 7.3107 10.4981 10.4981 
Average of Prices ($/MWh) 34.7123 34.7438 34.0731 34.2549 33.8092 34.4952 
VaR (95) 35.764 35.367 38.477 38.373 40.346 40.215 
VaR (99) 35.691 34.147 38.364 36.737 40.217 39.189 
CVaR (95) 35.726 34.705 38.404 37.420 40.255 39.617 
CVaR (99) 35.640 33.610 38.361 35.963 40.210 38.329 
Total CO2 Production (Ton) 2.4855×10
9 2.4380×109 2.4935×109 2.4186×109 2.3475×109 2.3754×109 
Ratio of CO2 Production to Total Generation 
(Ton/ MWh) 
0.6339 0.6375 0.6181 0.6287 0.6195 0.6398 
Total Generation of Wind Units(MWh) 2.6661×108 2.5578×108 3.0341×108 2.7154×108 3.1698×108 2.7178×108 
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The results of simulations conducted for three different 
cases depicted that the ratio-based incentive is more effective 
than the feed-in-tariff in the context of decreasing the risk of 
investment, reducing electricity price, reduction of CO2 
production, and speed of providing higher amounts of wind 
capacity. In other words, by distributing the same budget for 
the promotion of wind capacity through ratio-based incentive, 
the growth rate of wind capacity increased more, compared to 
the case that this budget was distributed under the feed-in-
tariff policy. This is because the timing of the payments gained 
importance in addition to the amount of payments.  
Furthermore, the ratio-based incentive did not slow the growth 
of wind capacity investment towards the end of the time 
horizon. Also, the ratio-based incentive benefited both the 
wind power producers and the consumers. It means that not 
only the producers' associated VaR and CVaR lower 
significantly with this incentive, but also the average 
electricity prices decreased during the 30 years-period.  
Although the presented incentive model provides a better 
picture for the policymakers to encourage the investors, it is 
not enough to accelerate the development of wind capacity. 
There are still important concerns, which need to be addressed 
with appropriate policies. Therefore, a more comprehensive 
policy is needed to consider other factors which affect the 
development of wind capacity. Such an incentive policy 
model should take into account the issues raised by the 
communities. For instance, a comprehensive policy should 
address environmental impacts, enhance social welfare, 
provide awareness on the positive aspects of wind technology, 
compensate land usage appropriately, and consider the public 
consultation during the planning process.  
In this paper, it was assumed that the price of natural gas is 
fixed. Therefore, in future research the behavior of the natural 
gas market can be simulated by a dynamic model and the gas 
price can be determined from the interaction of electricity and 
natural gas markets. Moreover, the performance of the ratio-
based incentive model in the electricity market can be 
examined by other dynamic models in future works.  
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